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In The Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
- vs. -





BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
--------
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF CASE 
Appellant was convicted of the crime of murder 
in the first degree in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 
76-30-3 (1953). The Honorable C. Nelson Day presid-
ed over appellant's jury trial in the Fifth Judicial 
District Court of Washington County, State of Utah, 
and, because of the absence of a jury recommenda-
tion of leniency, appellant was sentenced to be ex-
ecuted. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
On January 14, 1966, appellant was arraigned in 
th8 district court of the Fifth Judicial District, Wash-
ington County, State of Utah. on the charge of mur-
2 
der in the first degree. At arraignment, appellant 
entered a plea of not guilty. A jury trial resulted ir, 
a verdict of guilty of murder in the first degree and, 
no recommendation for leniency being made by the 
jury, the Honorable C. Nelson Day passed sentence · 
that the appellant be executed. The Honorable C. 
Nelson Day has ordered a stay of execution pending 
the appeal to this court. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent submits that the conviction should 
be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent basically agrees with appellant's 
chronological summation of the evidence adduced 
at appellant's jury trial. An additional factor that 
must be noted is that the prosecution contended 
and the evidence verified the fact that at the time of 
death, the deceased was reclined on a bed with his 
head propped up by a pillow and his hands folded 
across his chest, sound asleep (T.339, 738-739). 
However, certain characterizations of the nature 
of the evidence containerl. in appellant's brief are 
repudiated by respondent and, because these char-
acterizations constitute part of appellant's legal arqu-
ment, respondent will rebut them in the followim 
arguments. 
As to the facts relative to the composition of the 
jury, those prospective jurors acquainted with wit- ' 
3 
ness<::s for the pro:--:ecution, those acquainted with 
the d2ceased ulX~ h~s brother, those acquainted with 
the prosecutors, those acquainted with the defen-
dant. the pr2trial opinions, discussions, and expos-
ure to p~rported facts and the community attitudes as 
contained in appell:mt's brief, respondent submits 
that such matters are relevant and material only so 
far as those matters relate to the legal points raised 
on appeal. Therefore, respondent will limit its dis-
cussion to these points to the extent that they relate 
to the legal issues. 
However, as a preliminary matter, it must be 
noted that in a community the size of St. George, 
\V ashington County, Utah, it is only natural that the 
cti;:>:enry will be acquainted with the county sheriff, 
c'-;unty attorney, and other public officials chosen 
to represent them. It is also natural the individuals 
of the community are well acquainted with each 
other and know and discuss events as they relate 
to th2 communi~y. 
Appellant olso neglects to advise the court that 
.:,n examination of the record indicates that most, 
if not all, of the prospective jurors knew and re-
spE:ccted appellant's trial counsel. Although the 
b11·_:_3thy narrat!on set forth on pages 8 through 16 of 
·1~1;_)ellant's brief are evidently intended to serve as 
a founddtion for pomt two of appellant's argumern, 
1l rnus~ be recognized and admitted that at no time, 
c~1tlKn at the pretrial stages or at the trial stage itself, 
did '1pµellant move for a chJ.nge of venue, a contin-
4 
uance, or any other procedural method availabh 
to an accused to insure a fair trial. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT PRE-
JUDICIAL ERROR BY ALLOWING THE 
WASHINGTON COUNTY SHERIFF TO BE 
SWORN AS BAILIFF AND TAKE CUSTODY 
OF THE JURY DURING THE DELIBERAT-
IONS OF THE JURY AFTER THE SHERIFF 
HAD TESTIFIED AS A WITNESS FOR THE 
PROSECUTION. 
After both the prosecution and defense had 
given their closing arguments, the trial court called 
forth Evan G. Whitehead, Sheriff, Washington Coun-
ty, Utah, and the sheriff was then sworn by the clerk 
of the court as bailiff (T. 765. 766). The jury then in 
the custody of Sheriff Whitehead, retired to deliber-
ate their verdict. Although no objection was made 
at the time Sheriff Whitehead was sworn as bailiif 
and custodian of the jury, appelland now argues 
that such action constituted prejudicial error requir-
ing reversal of his conviction. 
Prior to Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466 (1965), 
it was clear that in the absence of an actual show-
ing of preiudice, an officer such as a sheriff could 
also act as bailiff notwithstanding the fact that the 
officer had been produced as a witness for the pros-
ecution and had given testimony in that regard. 
53 Am. Jur.Trial § 858, at 625 (1941); 5 Wharton, Crim-
inal and Procedure § 2109, at 290 n.2 (1957). In Odell 
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v. Hudspeth, 189 F.2d 300 (10th Cir. 1951), it was 
ci lleqed to constitute prejudicial error for a sheriff, 
d prosecuting witness, to also act as bailiff. The 
court, in holding the contention to be without merit, 
stu ted at 189 F.2d 303, ". . . There is no evidence 
that th2 sheriff did anything irregular in performing 
this function." See alsoNewby v. State, 188 Pac. 124 
(Okla. 1920); Watson v. State, 197 S.W.2d 1018 (Tex. 
l 946). 
Appellant relies strongly on Turner v. Louisiana, 
supra, for the proposition that an accused need not 
show actual prejudice resulting from the situation 
whereby a prosecution witness acts as bailiff, but 
thCJ.t such a relationship is so inherently prejudicial 
as to constitute a denial of due process. Because of 
this strong reliance on Turner v. Louisiana, supra, 
is it necessary to completely understand the circum-
stances that existed in that case. Turner was charged 
with murder committed during the course of a rob-
Lery (379 U.S. 466). During the course of the trial, 
two deputy sheriffs, considered "principle witnesses 
for the prosecution," (379 U.S. 467), were called to 
tPstify. One of the deputy sheriffs testified as to: 
... IC [ertain damaging admissions which he said 
had been made bv Turner at the time of his appre-
hension. In addition, Simmons r the deputy J des-
cribed the circumstances under which he said he 
had later prevailed upon Turner to make a written 
confession. This confession was introduced in evi-
dence. (879 U.S. 467). 
The issue as to whether the defendant had vol-
Ulltaril y given the confession was raised, and on 
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the strength of the testimony of the two deputy 
sheriffs, was resolved against the defendant. 
The necessity and credibility of the deputies 
testimony was obviously a vital cog in the prosecu-
tion's proof of Turner's guilt. As stated by the Court 
at 379 U.S. 473: 
It is to be emphasized that the testimony of [the 
deputies l was not confined to so:ne uncontroverted 
or merely formal aspect of the case for the prosecut-
ion. On the contrflry, the credibility which the jury 
attached to the testimony of these two key witness-
es must inevitably have determined whether Wayne 
Turner was to be sentenced to his death. 
The nature of the association between the depu-
ties and the jury was described by the Court at 379 
U.S. 468: 
The deputies drove the jurors to a restaurant for 
each meal, and to their lodgings each night. The 
deputies ate with them. conversed with them, and 
did errands for them. 
The Court further stated at 379 U.S. 473: 
We deal here not with a brief encounter, but with a 
continuous and intimate association throughout a 
three-day trial- m1 association which gave these 
witnesses an opportunity, as Simmons put it, to re-
new old friendships and make new acquaintances 
ar;iong the '.".1ember of the jury. 
Under these circumstances, the Court conclud-
ed at 379 U.S. 473: 
... it would be blinking- reality not to recog-
nize the extreme prejudice inherent in this contin-
7 
ual association throughout the trial between the 
jurors and these two key witnesses for the prosecut-
ion. 
A brief examination of the testimony given by 
Sheriff Whitehead in the instant case reveals that 
the sheriff's testimony was not of such a nature as 
to bring the case within the confines of Turner v. 
Louisiana. supra. Briefly, the sheriff testified that he 
arrived at the scene of the crime at approximately 
2:00 p.m., on November 9, 1965 (T. 374, 375). The 
house of the deceased and its location were de-
scribed (T. 359-379) and the sheriff then related how 
he conducted a short investigative search of the 
premises (T. 380). During the course of his testimony, 
the sheriff also identified plaintiff's exhibits, 4, 5, 6, 
7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, and 17 ('f. 380 - 391), 
which are pictures of the deceased's house, the in-
terior of the house, and the interior of the room 
wherein the deceased was discovered. The sheriff 
also testified that he subsequently came into con-
tact with one Vern Phillips, who brought two guns, 
one a twenty-two caliber rifle which was alleged to 
be the murder weapon, to the sheriff at his office 
(T. 397, 398). A brief narrative was then given as to 
the sheriff taking the appellant into custody in Las 
Vegas, Nevada, on November 3, 1965, and returning 
appellant to St. George, Washington County, Utah 
(T. 401, 402). The sheriff did not testify as to any con-
versation that may have occurred between the ap-
pellant and the sheriff during the time the appel-
lant was being transported back to St. George, Utah. 
As a matter of fact, at no time did the sheriff testify 
8 
as to any conversation transpiring between himself 
and the appellant. 
It is obvious from a brief review of the testimony 
of Sheriff Whitehead that the sheriff's testimony 
was not a necessary element in the prosecution's 
case as in Turner v. touisiana, supra. The sheriff's 
testimony was confined to uncontroverted and 
merely formal aspects of the prosecution's case. 
Therefore, on this basis alone, Turner v. Louisiana, 
supra, would not be applicable. 
Several cases since Turner v. Louisiana, supra, 
have considered the point now pursued by appel-
lant and have concluded that Turner v. Louisiana, 
supra, did not apply. Ex parte Bertsch, 395 S.W.2d 
620 (Tex. 1965). In Bryant v. State, 397 S.W.2d 445, 
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 858 (Tex. 1965), the sheriff acted 
in capacity of bailiff and the defendant relied on Tur-
ner v. Louisiana, supra. 
The court recognized the fact that the defendant 
made no objection at the time the sheriff took cus-
tody of the jury, hut at the hearing, because of the 
claim denial of due process, stated at 397 S.W.2d 
452, " ... we have examined the record and find no 
merit in such contention." Also, in Jackson v. State, 
403 S.W.2d 145, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 938 (Tex. 1966), 
the court stated at 403 S.\V.2d 148: 
The nature and extent of the association of the 
Sheriff with the jury and his testimony pertaining 
to the case, did not reveal such association or com-
munication with the jury as would call for a re-
versal under Turner. 
9 
See also Whisman v. State, 221 Ga. 460, 145 
S.E.2d 499 (1965). 
The case of Bowles v. State, 366 F.2d 734 (5th 
Cir. 1966), also involved a murder conviction. As to 
rho relationship between the prosecution witnesses 
cJ.nd the jury, the court stated at 366 F.2d 736: 
Except when they were in the courtroom or deliber-
ating, the sheriff or his deputies were in attendance 
upon the jury at all times .... As a necessary cons-
c:quence, the sheriff came into contact with the jury 
on several occasions during the long trial. It was in-
evitable that he do so. 
The court further stated at 366 F.2d 736 n. 3: 
Although we are mindful of the Supreme Court's 
admonition in Turner v. State of Louisiana . .. that 
such contact oul!ht not be condoned, we feel that in 
the circumstances of this case we are not 'blinking 
I at l reality' in finding the contact non-prejudicial. 
It was considered to be the merest pedantry to 
insist on strict procedural regularity when the lapse 
therefrom did not result in any harm or preiudicG 
1o the accused. In recognizing the impossibility of 
such strict procedural regularity, the court stated at 
366 F.2d 738: 
In rural areas. almost necessarily, this same officer 
I the sheriff I will come into contact with the jury 
in the normal course of a trial. It is often his duty 
to escort the jury to meals and to stand guard dur-
in r their dP\ihcr:1tions. To assert that Turner re-
quires the invalidation of all convictions in which 
formal testimonv was used is too narrow a con-
struction of its .tPachings and rationale. The dual 
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role which the sheriff's duties sometimes require 
of him presents an ever-present and inherent danger 
of running afoul of the strictures of Turner and 
should be avoided when possible. However, the mere 
existence of contact between the sheriff and 
the jurors resulting from the performance of pre-
functory duties required by law and the orderly con-
duct of court is not sufficient in and of itself to in-
validate the conviction. \Ve find that the perform-
ance by the sheriff of his judicial administrative 
functions required by state law in the circumstances 
and under the facts presented in this case does not 
require the invalidation of the conviction. 
Appellant overlooks the impropriety and effect 
of the statements made by the bailiff to certain jurors 
in Parker v. Gladden, 87 Sup.Ct. 468 (1966). These 
statements were, "Oh, that wicked fellow [ peti-
tioner J, he is guilty," (87 Sup.Ct. 470), and statement2 
to the effect that the state supreme court would cor-
rect any error if the jury should find the defendant 
guilty (87 Sup.Ct. 470). Also, the fact that the jury 
deliberated for twenty-six hours, showing disagree-
ment, and the fact that one juror testified that she 
had been prejudiced by the statements of the bailiff, 
contributed in no small part to the decision of the 
United States Supreme Court. 
The Utah cases cited by appellant are clearly 
distinguishable. For example, in State v. Anderson. 
65 Utah 415, 237 Pac. 941 (1925), a prosecuting wit-
ness had given a substantial favor to a juror thereby 
creating an indebtedness from the juror to the wit-
ness and the prosecution. This activity also occurred 
on more than one occasion. In State v. Crank, 105 
Utah 332, 152 P.d 178 (1943), the court granted a new 
11 
trial on other grounds and was not required to de-
termine whether the conduct such as the conversa-
tion between the juror and the witness immediately 
prior to submission of the case to the jury alone con-
stituted qrounds for reversal. 
Respondent submits that the proper Utah posi-
tion is stated in State v. Hines, 6 Utah 2d 126, 307 P.2d 
887 (1957), wherein this court stated at 307 P.2d 889: 
It is further to be observed that the reporter is an 
officer of the court, fully acquainted with court pro-
cedures and the proper conduct of jurors. Request-
ing her to accompany the lady jurors was done as a 
precaution by the judge that the privacy of the jury 
be assured. In the absence of any indication of im-
propriety, to assume that some irregularity occurred 
which prevented the defendants from having a fair 
trial, would require us to indulge in conjecture. 
This is neither warranted under the circumstances, 
nor within our prerogative should we desire to do so. 
[Emphasis added. J 
Also, this court stated in State v. Rivenburgh, l l 
Utah 2d 95, 355 P.2d 680, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 922 
(1960), at 11Utah2d l 12: 
Where separation of [the] j u r y i s f o r 
I the J purpose of necessity, under surveillance of 
bailiff, and there is no communication within a 
juror, prejudice will not be presumed and the bur-
den is on the defendant to establish that he is pre-
judiced by the alleged separation. 
The court further stated at 11 Utah 2d 112: 
In the instant case ... no evidence was adduced 
that anyone conversed with the juror during the 
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deliberation. No prejudice being shown by the de-
fendant, the contention of separation of the jury is 
not well taken. [Emphasis added J. 
Respondent submits that the facts and testimony 
of Sheriff Whitehead in the instant case preclude 
the applicability of the inherently prejudice rule 
set forth in Turner v. Louisiana, supra. Subsequent 
cases that not strictly apply the rationale of that case 
must be considered together with the failure of ap-
pellant to voice any objection at the time Sheriff 
Whitehead was sworn in as bailiff. Therefore, appel-
lant's contention in this regard is without merit. 
POINT II 
APPELLANT WAS NOT DENIED A FAIR 
TRIAL AS A RESULT OF THE COMMUNITY 
PATTERN OF THOUGHT AS EXPRESSED BY 
POTENTIAL JURORS AND AS A RESULT OF 
THE PR 0 XI MIT Y OF RELATIONSHIPS 
WHICH EXISTED BETWEEN MEMBERS OF 
THE .JURY AND WITNESSES FOR THE 
PROSECUT10N, THE VICTIM, THE PROSE-
CUTORS, AND THE DEFENDANT. 
Appellant, for the first time, now seeks to in-
validate his conviction on the grounds that he was 
denied a fair trial because of a pattern of community 
thought that existed against him. This argument is 
analogous in reasoning and application of prece-
dent to a claimed denial of a fair trial due to ad-
verse pretrial publicity. In support of this position, 
appellant relies on Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961 ). 
However, appellant fails to fully recognize that Irvin 
v. Dowd did not require complete isolation of a pros-
pective juror from life and the accompanying mediu 
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of communication. As stated by the United States 
Supreme Court at 366 U.S. 722: 
It is not required, however. that the jurors be to-
tally ignorant of the facts and issues involved. In 
these days of swift, widespread and diverse methods 
of communication, an important case can be expect-
ed to arouse the interest of the public in the vicin-
ity, and scaiTely an:v of those best qualified to serve 
as jurnrs will not have formed some impression or 
opinion as to the merits of the case. This is partic-
ularly true in criminal cases. To hold that the mere 
existence of any preconceived notion as to the guilt 
or innocence of an accused, without more, is suffic-
ient to rebuke the presumption of a prospective 
juror's impartiality would be to establish an imposs-
ible standard. It i'l sufficient if the juror can lay 
aside his impression or opinion and render a verdict 
based on the evidence presented in court. 
One important preliminary consideration to be 
given the issue now raised by appellant is that a 
wide degree of d1scretion is vested in a trial court 
in determining whether an impartial jury may be 
obtained. This determination should not be over-
ruled unless it may clearly be shown that the trial 
court abused its discretion. Annot., Pretrial Publicity 
in Criminal Case as Affecting Defendant's Right to 
Fair Trial-Federal Cases, 10 L.Ed.2d 1243, § 6 (a), at 
1266 (1964). 
Appellant does not single out or rely on any 
one occurrence to justify a conclusion that the trial 
court abused its discretion in determining the re-
liability of the responses of the prospective jurors. 
Rather, appellant attempts to point to various simi-
larities allegedly existing between the instant case 
and Irvin v. Dowd, supra. However, the only similar-
ity between the two cases is that both trials were 
held in small communities. 
The record clearly indicates that appellant 
failed to utilize several methods devised to insure 
him a fair and impartial trial. For example, where ad-
verse pretrial publicity or a communal pattern of 
thought exists so as to deprive a defendant of a fair 
trial, several methods, including a motion for a 
change of venue, a continuance, a dismissal, a 
change of venire or a challenge for cause, either 
singly or collectively applied to the jury panel, may 
be invoked by the defendant. In the instant case, th9 
record is devoid of any such motions on the part of 
appellant and clearly indicates that the jury panel 
was passed for cause by the defendant (R. 275). 
In light of the appellant's failure to invoke the 
above enumerated methods of insuring a fair and 
impartial trial, appellant may not now raise the issue 
on appeal. Latham v. Crouse, 320 F.2d 120 (10th Cir. 
1963). wherein the court stated at 320 F.2d 123: 
In the case before us the record discloses that prior 
to the exercise of any peremptory challenges, de-
fense counsel passed all jurors for cause. Be that as 
it may, the claim of jury prejudice because of the 
telecast was not presented to the trial court and 
hence is not before us for review. 
In Hopt v. Utah, 120 U.S. 430 (1887), the United 
States Supreme Court held that the trial court did 
not err in refusing to excuse a juror who had read 
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a newspaper report of the case, but who stated that 
he was not conscious of any bias or prejudice so as 
to prevent him from being fair and impartial and 
that he could try the case on the evidence adduced 
in court. 
The same situation exists in the instant case. 
The trial court, believing the assertions of the pros-
pecfrre jurors that the defendant could receive a 
fair and impartial trial, did not abuse its discretion. 
Every prospective juror was fully questioned re-
garding any preconceived bias or prejudice that 
would prevent him from being fair and impartial. 
Defense counsel had the opportunity to voir dire. In 
light of the record, including appellant's passing of 
the jury panel for cause, no error exists which would 
give merit to appellant's claim. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS 
DISCRETION IN ALLOWING C E RT A IN 
COLORED SLIDES OF THE AUTOPSY OF THE 
DECEASED TO BE INTRODUCED INTO EVI-
DENCE. 
It must be conceded that the admissibility of 
photographs is a matter of judicial discretion and 
the finding of the trial court will not be disturbed 
unless it is clearly shown that the discretion has 
been abused. Potts v. People. 114 Colo. 253, 158 P.2d 
739 (1945); Martinez v. People. 124 Colo. 170, 235 P.2d 
810 (1951); 17 Okla. L. Rev. 33 (1964); 40 Texas L. Rev. 
284 (1961). 
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The standard generally applied to the admis-
sibility of photographs was set forth by the Supreme 
Court of Colorado in Potts v. People, supra. where-
in the court stated at 158 P.2d 740: 
They are not inadmissible merely because they 
bring vividly to the jurors the details of a shock-
ing crime or tend to arouse passion or prejudice .... 
It is only when photographs do not illustrate or 
make clear some issue of the case, and when they 
are of such a character as to prejudice the jury, that 
they are not admissible. 
Appellant alleges that the photographs admit-
ted into evidence in the instant case were not neces-
sary because there was no question as to the death 
of the deceased or as to the cause of the death. (Ap-
pellant's brief, p.40). However, appellant neglects 
to recognize that the entire entry of a plea of not 
guilty puts in issue every ma.terial allegation of the 
information or indictment. Utah Code Ann. § 77-24-4 
(1953). Therefore, to establish appellant's guilt of the 
crime of murder in the first degree, the prosecution 
was required to prove all of the elements of murder 
in the first degree including the fact of death and 
the fact that the death was caused by and through 
the willful, deliberate, malicious and premeditated 
act or acts of the accused. 
The autopsy slides corroborated the testimony 
of Dr. LeCheminant who testified that at the autopsy, 
he recovered metal fragments from the skull of the 
deceased (T. 437, 438), traced the paths of the two 
wounds received by the deceased (T. 440), and con-
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eluded tha_t the sole cause of death of the deceased 
was due to gunshot wounds to the head (T. 441). 
The metal fragments recovered by Dr. LeChem-
ina.nt were later identified by a firearms expert fro:;n 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation as being fired 
from the twenty-two caliber rifle, exhibit P-28, al-
leged by the prosecution to be the murder weapon 
(T. 493). The doctor's testimony also verified the sole 
cause of death and the fact that the death was pre-
cipita_ted by and through a criminal act. Also, by 
tracing the paths of the death-dealing bullets, the 
testimony verified the fact that the deceased was 
lving down when he was shot, thus establishing the 
malicious intent and premeditation of the perpetra-
tor of the crime. The essence of the recovery of the 
bullet fragments and subsequent linkage to the al-
leged murder weapon is obvious. 
In Potts v. People, supra, the court stated at 158 
P.2d 740: 
Photographs are the pictured expression of data 
observed by a witness. They are often more accurate 
than any description by words, and give a clearer 
comprehension of the physical facts than can be 
obtained from the testimony of witnesses. Ordinar-
ily photographs are competent evidence of anything 
which it is competent for a witness to describe in 
words. 
In State v. Johnson, 57 N.M. 716, 263 P.2d 282 
(1953), the Supreme Court of New Mexico consid-
l"JE?d a first degree murder conviction wherein the 
issue as to the admissibility of autopsy photographs 
Wcts raised. The court stated at 263 P.2d 284, 285: 
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It is argued that the court erred in the admis-
sion of certain photographs. The photographs show 
the scalp had been removed from the skull of the 
deceased, exposing fractures of the skull and certain 
fleshy part of the head and shoulders of the de-
ceased. The objection made is that the pictures are 
so gruesome and inflammatory, the minds of the jur-
ors were prejudiced thereby. We do not so appraise 
them. While the doctor testified in terms descriptive 
of the wounds, the photographs gave the jury a vis-
ual explanation of his testimony. It must be remem-
bered that appellant was standing on his plea of not 
guilty when the photographs were admitted. The 
state was put to the task of proving the essential 
elements of the crime. Whether the deceased was 
fatally injured was an issue to be determined by the 
jury. The extent and nature of the wound and the 
atrocity of the crime also were material questions. 
Clearly, the photographs, though cumulative, serv-
ed to corroborate the doctor's testimony and were 
admissible for that purpose. 
The court concluded that the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in allowing the introduction of 
the autopsy photographs. 
Appellant's argument also fails to recognize the 
procedure employed by the trial court in determin-
ing the admissibility of the autopsy photographs. 
The records clearly disclose that the trial court ad-
monished and excused the jury and then proceeded 
to view the photographs in the presence of the pros-
ecution and appellant and his counsel before pro-
ceeding (T. 422-427). Appellant objected on the 
grounds that the body depicted in the photographs 
was not properly identified as the body of the de-
ceased. No objection to the admissibility of the 
photographs was made on the grounds that they 
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were gruesome and would tend to arouse the pas-
sion and prejudice of the jury against appellant. 
Also, appellant's inference that auotpsy photo-
graphs are inadmissible merely because of the ad-
mittedly distasteful event which they reproduce is 
clearly erroneous. Potts v. People, supra; Martinez 
v. People, supra; State v. Johnson, supra. 
Appellant's reference to State v. Russell, 106 
Utah 116, 145 P.2d 1003 (1944), does not support ap-
pellant's position. This court stated at 145 P.2d 1010: 
There is no merit in the other errors assigned. The 
pictures of the deceased, taken after her death and 
showing her wounds, were clearly admissible. Even 
though the defendant did admit the killing, he did 
not admit the intent to kill and the nature of the 
wounds may be material on that point. The pictures 
showed the nature of the wounds more clearly than 
the testimony of witnesses. 
Respondent submits that the autopsy photo-
graphs admitted into evidence in the instant case 
clearly met the established standards governing 
such admissibility, and appellant has failed to show 
a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the trial 
court in allowing the introduction of the photo-
graphs. This court should not disturb the decision 
of the trial court. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT PRE-
JUDICIAL ERROR IN ADVISING THE JURY 
AS TO THE CONTACT THE TRIAL COURT 
HAD WITH A WITNESS FOR THE PROSE-
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CUTION PRIOR TO THE WITNESS' TESTI-
FYING IN THE INSTANT CASE. 
Respondent accepts appellant's general state-
ment that all issues of fact are to be submitted to the 
jury and that the trial court should, neither expressly 
nor by implication, indicate its opinion as to the facts 
or the weight to be given the evidence. State v. Har-
ris, 1 Utah 2d 264 P.2d 284 (1953). Respondent sub-
mits, however, that the comments made to the jury 
by the trial court regarding Delton Ray Nance, a 
witness for the prosecution, were not comments 
bearing on the credibility of Mr. Nance or the weight 
to be given Mr. Nance's testimony. Rather, the com-
ments merely clarified an inference raised by de-
fense counsel which was incorrect and improper. 
To adequately understand the trial court's comments 
as they occurred, it is necessary to quote at length 
from the transcript, pages 725-726: 
Q. After this conversation that you said you had 
with Mr. Poe, where you placed on probation? 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. By whom? 
A. By the court. 
Q. Which court? 
A. The court here. 
THE COURT: I placed him on probation, Mr. 
Morris. 
Q. When was that done? 
A. I was placed on probation in December. 
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After the above questions were propounded to 
the witness by counsel for appellant, the court sum-
moned both the prosecution and counsel for ap-
pellant to the bench where an off the record discus-
sion took place. The court then stated: 
Gentlemen of the jury, before commenting to you 
on this matter very briefly, I have discussed the 
matter with counsel up here at the bench. When 
Mr. Nance was questioned by counsel with regard 
to his being in the cell with Mr. Poe or conversat-
ions he had with Mr. Poe, this was the first I had 
ever heard of the matter. I am the judge who placed 
Mr. Nance on probation and I placed him on pro-
bation I don't remember when but some months ago 
under the supervision and direction of the Adult 
Probation and Parole Department of the State of 
Utah. Mr. Alan Keller is the agent of that office 
who works out of Provo and has general supervis-
ion over Mr. Nance and other probationers in the 
Fifth District. I know Mr. Keller requires proba-
tioners to report to the sheriff's office each month 
and have them cosign their monthly reports each 
month; and I assume while Mr. Nance was in Wash-
ington County that he reported to the sheriff's of-
fice here for that purpose. Mr. Nance, it is true, 
is it not, that Mr. Keller is your probation officer? 
THE WITNESS: Yes, sir, he is my probation of-
ficer. 
THE COURT: I want it clear that I have never 
heard about any connection with Mr. Nance and 
the Poe case until this afternoon when you were on 
the stand. Mr. Burns, I understand that you are 
through with this witness, then? 
It is obvious by the trial court's comments to the 
jury that the trial court was merely rectifying the 
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incorrect inference drawn by counsel for the de-
fendant that the witness received probation because 
of his statement relating to the instant case. The 
court, based on its own knowledge of the witness 
and the witness' case and subsequent probation, 
knew this inference to be incorrect. The trial court, 
as the court that placed the witness on probation, 
was justified in advising the jury that the probation 
given the witness was independent of any connec-
tion the witness had to the instant case. This is so 
because the trial court knew, by his own knowl-
edge, that this was the case. 
A witness testifying on behalf of an accused is 
entitled to a proper reflection of his character and 
credibility before the jury. If the prosecution raises 
an inference detrimental to this image which is im-
proper and incorrect and one which the trial court, 
based on its own knowledge and familiarity with 
the witness, knows to be incorrect, the witness and 
the accused are entitled to the trial court's correction 
of the adverse implication. For the trial court not to 
speak out and correct the record would be tanta-
mount to suppression of evidence favorable to the 
accused. The prosecution and its witnesses are no 
less entitled to this protection. 
Also, it must be acknowledged that the explana-
tory comments by the trial court to the jury followed 
an off the record discussion of the matter between 
the trial court, the prosecution and defense counsel. 
At the time the comments were made to the jury by 
the trial court, no objection was interposed by de-
fense counsel. 
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A comparison of the facts of the instant case 
and the comments made by the trial court in State v. 
Harris, supra, reveals the inapplicability of State v. 
Harris. supra. In the instant case, the trial court did 
not comment on the testimony of Mr. Nance nor did 
the trial court indicate his belief as to the credibility 
of Mr. Nance. Rather, the trial court merely corrected 
the adverse inference made by defense counsel that 
the witness' probation resulted from the willingness 
of the witness to testify in the instant case. In State 
v. Harris, supra, the trial court limited the jury's de-
liberations to whether a record of a prior conviction 
was authentic and then proceeded to comment on 
the authenticity of the record. The court indicated 
\·hat the authenticity of the record could be doubted 
only if the jury concluded that a witness for the 
prosecution had committed perjury. The facts are 
clearly distinguishable. 
In the instant case, the trial court, in instruction 
No. 28, instructed the jury: 
In determining the facts or any fact in this case 
you should not consider nor be influenced by any 
statement made or act done by the court which you 
may interpret as indicating its views thereon. You 
are the sole and final judges of all questions of fact 
submitted to you, and you must determine such 
questions for yourselves from the evidence and with-
out regard to what you believe the court thinks 
thereon. The court had not intended to express, 
or intimidate, or be understood as giving any opin-
ion on what the proof shows or does not show, or 
what are or what are not the facts in the case. And 
it is immaterial what the court thinks thereon. You 
as jurors must follow your own views and not be 
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influenced by the views of the court. If any act or 
expression of mine has seemed to indicate an opin-
ion relating to any of these matters, you are in-
structed to disregard it entirely. 
Therefore, the corrective instruction given to 
the jury by the trial court as set forth above eradi-
cates any prejudice which the appellant may now 
claim. 
POINT V 
THERE IS NO CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF 
ERRORS JUSTIFYING A REVERSAL IN THE 
INSTANT CASE. 
The dactrine announced in State v. St. Clair. 3 
Utah 2d 230, 282 P.2d 323 (1955), that in some in-
stances errors, which when standing alone would 
not justify reversal, may have such a cumulative 
effect so as to deprive the accused of a fair trial, is 
not disputed by respondent. However, respondent 
submits that the instant case does not meet the de-
gree of error and criteria set forth in State v. St. Clair. 
supra. The duty of the appellate court is set forth 
in 3 Utah 2d 244: 
On the basis of such appraisal, if the court can say 
with assurance that the evidence of the defendant's 
guilt was so clear and convicing that no reasonable 
jury could be expected to return a different verdict, 
even in the absence of the irregularities, then the 
errors would be harmless and the verdict should be 
permitted to stand. On the other hand, if there is a 
reasonable liklihood that in the absence of the 
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errors a different verdict might have been rendered, 
a new trial should be granted. [emphasis added]. 
In the instant case; there is no cumulation of 
errors so as to justify a_ conclusion that a different 
verdict would have been reached by the jury in 
the absence of such errors. In State v. St. Clair, 
supra, the cumulation of errors supported this 
court's finding that it was reasonably likely the ver-
dict of the jury would have been different but for 
the errors. However, the alleged errors in the in-
stant case do not justify such a conclusion. There is 
no indication that the appellant did not receive a 
fair trial because he was tried in St. George, Wash-
ington County, Utah. Appellant now submits that 
the failure of the jury to recommend leniency is evi-
dence of a prejudicial impact on the jurors as argued 
in appellant's brief. (Appellant's brief p. 48). This 
argument totally ignores the senseless manner by 
which the deceased, while asleep, was shot in the 
face twice by a twenty-two caliber single action rifle 
at close range. The failure of the jury to recommend 
leniency cannot be traced to any prejudicial error 
as alleged by appellant, but rather, is directly trace-
able to the bestial manner by which the deceased 
was murdered. It was not a community pattern of 
thought that resulted in appellant's conviction. The 
conviction resulted from a commendable presenta-
tion of the state's evidence by the prosecution from 
which only one conclusion could be drawn, namely, 
that the appellant with the requisite intent, did in 
fact murder another human being. To now say that 
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the appellant was convicted because he committed 
his crime in a community where he was a stranger 
is to ignore the basic principles on which a jury sys-
tem is predicated. 
To conclude that a cumulation of errors has pre-
cluded appellant from having a fair trial first neces-
sitates a conclusion that errors were committed. Re-
spondent submits that this is not the case and that 
State v. St. Clair, supra, is clearly distinguishable. 
Respondent submits that this court should fol-
low State v. Sinclair. 15 Utah 2d 163, 389 P.2d 469 
(1964), wherein it is stated at 15 Utah 2d 170: 
Under our statute [Utah Code Ann. § 77-42-1 
(1953) ], which requires that errors which do not 
affect the essential rights of the parties be disre-
garded, we cannot properly interfere with the jury's 
verdict, unless upon a review of the whole case it 
should appear that there was error of sufficient 
gravity that the defendant's rights were prejudiced 
in some substantial way. We have found nothing of 
any such consequence here. [Emphasis added]. 
Respondent submits that a review of the whole 
record requires a conclusion that the appellant re-
ceived a fair trial and that no error was committed 
that prejudiced appellant in a substantial way. 
CONCLUSION 
It is obvious that the jury was clearly convinced 
from the evidence adduced at the trial of appellant's 
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The record substan-
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tiates and necessitates a conclusion that no error 
was committed that resulted in a substantial preju-
dice to appellant. Therefore, respondent submits 
that appellant's contentions are wholly without 
merit and that the conviction be affirmed. 
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